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We consider a non-cooperative symmetric three-stage game played by a pair of 
regulator-firm hierarchies to capture the scale and technological effects of opening 
markets to international trade. Each firm produces one good sold on the market. The 
production process generates pollution characterized by a fixed emission/output ratio, 
and crosses the borders. Firms can invest in R&D in order to lower their emission ratio, 
and this activity is characterized by positive R&D spillovers (β).  
We show that R&D spillovers and the competition of firms on the common market help 
non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. 
When the R&D spillover increases,  pollution decreases in most cases, and increases in 
some others. However, the social welfare improves with β. 
Opening markets to international trade leads to both more investment in R&D and more 
production, and to a lower emission ratio. In most cases, pollution in common market is 
lower than in autarky, implying a greater social welfare. Nevertheless, in some other 
cases, international trade increases pollution and therefore reduces the social welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
 
We develop a dynamic theoretical model to show how R&D spillovers and the 
competition of firms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to 
internalize transboundary pollution. This model also captures the scale and 
technological effects of opening markets to international trade, and shows that, in 
most cases, free mobility of goods among countries reduces pollution and improves 
the social welfare. Thus, this work is related to the literature on transboundary 
pollution and to the one on free trade and the environment. To our knowledge, there 
is no published theoretical work that studies transboundary pollution in the context 
of R&D possibilities and/or studies the technological effect of free trade in presence 
of transfrontier pollution, while taking into account the impact on the social welfare. 
Examples of damages engendered by tranfrontier pollution are the ozone layer 
depletion and global warming which are caused by the total emissions of gazes such 
as the carbon dioxide. Transboundary pollution is therefore a negative externality 
among countries which usually does not lead non-cooperating countries to the 
Pareto-optimality. However, some authors have shown that non-cooperating 
governments can reach the first best under some conditions (Hoel (1997), Zagonari 
(1998)). Other studies have been interested in the effect of asymmetric information on 
transboundary externalities (Bac (1996), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996), Mansouri 
and Ben Youssef (2000)).  
The relation between international trade and pollution can be explained by three 
main effects. The scale effect linking pollution to the scale of production and it is 
expected that free trade increases production and therefore pollution. The 
composition effect admits that certain dirty industries could relocate in countries 
with more lenient regulations. The technological effect refers to the possibility that 
international competition may encourage the innovation and diffusion of cleaner 
technologies to reduce the pollution intensity.  
Copeland and Taylor (1995) show  that free trade may raise world pollution, and 
because pollution crosses the borders, uncoordinated regulation of pollution at the 
national level does not eliminate all market failures, and consequently free trade   3
does not necessarily raise welfare. Fernandez (2002) examines empirically the effects 
of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution between the United States 
and Mexico. She shows that trade liberalization gives incentives to use wastewater as 
input to produce the traded cotton, thus reducing pollution. Péchoux and Pouyet 
(2003) show that, under incomplete information, international competition generated 
by the common market enables regulators to reduce the informational rents captured 
by firms, thereby reinforcing the need to open the markets to international 
competition.  Many papers (Copeland and Taylor (1994), Reppelin-Hill (1999), 
Antweiler et al. (2001)) highlight the technological effect but they don’t consider 
transboundary pollution and don’t prove any result concerning the welfare effects of 
free trade.  
This paper differs from the existing literature by studying a three-stage game in 
which R&D is carried out to reduce the emissions per-unit of production, in the 
context of R&D spillovers and transboundary pollution. This model also captures 
the scale and technological effects and tries to answer the question of whether 
opening markets to international trade reduces pollution and increases the social 
welfare. 
We consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game played by two 
regulator-firm hierarchies. In the third stage, each firm produces one good sold on 
the market. The production process generates pollution characterized by a fixed 
emission/output ratio, and crosses the borders. In the second stage, firms can invest 
in R&D in order to lower their emission ratio. As in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) where firms invest in R&D to lower their per-unit production cost, this 
innovation activity is characterized by positive R&D spillovers (b). In the first stage, 
regulators propose non-cooperatively their contracts which should be accepted by 
their respective firms while giving the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of 
pollution (or production) and R&D. We study the complete information context. Our 
objective is to assess the role of R&D spillovers and the opening of markets in the 
control of transboundary pollution, and to compare the equilibrium values in 
autarky and common market. We hope to contribute to the understanding of the   4
interaction between the scale and technological effects in case of transboundary 
pollution. 
We show that without R&D spillover ( b=0), transboundary pollution is not 
internalized in the autarky regime. The higher R&D spillovers are, the higher is the 
proportion of transboundary pollution internalized by non-cooperating countries. 
Consequently, in most cases, pollution decreases with the R&D spillover whereas  
the social welfare increases. Surprisingly, in some other cases, pollution increases 
with b. Moreover, opening markets to international trade helps countries to better 
internalize transboundary pollution through firms’ competition on the common 
market.  
International competition leads to both more investment in R&D and more 
production, and to a lower emission ratio. When the sensitivity of consumers to the 
environment is sufficiently low, pollution in common market is lower than in 
autarky, implying a greater social welfare. Nevertheless, when the sensitivity of 
consumers to the environment and the investment cost parameter are high enough , 
pollution in common market is higher than in autarky; thus, the non-internalized 
transboundary pollution may be greater, even if opening markets enables to better 
internalize the transfrontier externality; moreover, the increase of production and 
innovation may decrease the profit of firms, leading to a diminution of the social 
welfare.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in autarky, 
resolves it and exhibits the role of the R&D spillovers for the internalization of 
transboundary pollution. Section 3 deals with the case where markets are opened to 
international trade and shows how this contributes to internalize transborder 
pollution. Section 4 compares the equilibrium in autarky and common market, and 
section 5 gives some comparative static about the R&D spillover parameter. Finally, 
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2. Autarky 
 
We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two firms. Firm i 
located in country i is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity qi sold 
in the domestic market with the following inverse demand function : 
p a q a i i = - > 2 0 , . The market size of each country is therefore a/2.  
The production process generates pollution and firms can invest in R&D in order 
to lower their fixed emission/output ratio. The level xiof R&D costs kx k i
2 0 , . >  
If we denote the marginal cost of production by  q>0, the profit of firm  i  is : 
P i
a
i i i i i p q q q kx = - - ( ) q
2. 
The innovation activity carried out by the firms is characterized by positive 
externalities which imply that a proportion b of each firm’s R&D level gratuitously 
spillovers to the other firm. Therefore, the direct external effect of firm j’s R&D level 
is to lower firm i’s emission/output ratio. This can be made possible by scientific 
communications, scientific exchanges or intelligence activities, which we assume 
have negligible costs. By normalizing the emissions per-unit of production to one 
without innovation, the emission/output ratio of firm i is :  
e x x x x i i j i j = - - £ < < + < 1 0 1 0 1 b b b , ,  
The emission of pollution of firm i is therefore : E e q i i i = . 
There are also negative externalities between countries through transborder 
pollution. Damages caused to country i are:  0 , 0 , > > + = g a g a j i i E E D . 
Notice that even when a and g are different, the model still remains symmetric 
because these parameters are the same for the two countries. This damage function 
can explain a pure transfrontier pollution problem when  a=d(1-t) and g=dt, where 
0<t<1 is the proportion of pollution of firm j exported to country i. It can also explain 
an international environmental problem, when a=g, because damages in one country 
become a function of the total pollution. To explain how transfrontier pollution can 
be internalized, we will separate the negative effect of the foreign pollution from the 
one of the home pollution by working with a and g separately up to section 3, and 
then, to facilitate our computations, we will assimilate g to a.    6
The consumer surplus in country  i engendered by the consumption of  qi is 
2




i q q q p dt t p CS = - =￿ . 
Since firm i is a regional monopoly that pollutes the environment, it should be 
regulated. The regulator can use two types of instruments : an emission tax per-unit 
of pollution to induce the non-cooperative socially optimal levels of production and 
pollution, and a subsidy per-unit of R&D to induce the non-cooperative socially 
optimal levels of R&D and emission/output ratio. Unfortunately, computations are 
not easy to do with this method of regulation. Indeed, the regulator must choose 
both the non-cooperative socially optimal emission tax and subsidy in the first stage 
given the reaction of the firm which will choose its non-cooperative optimal levels of 
R&D and production in the second and third stages, respectively. So, we consider 
another method of regulation which eases computations. 
In the first stage, each regulator offers to his firm a contract  ( , , ) q x T i i i  where qi 
and  xi are the levels of production and innovation to be attained by firm i, and Ti is 
a monetary transfer inducing the firm to accept this contract. The value of  Ti is as 
such that the net profit of the firm will be at least equal to its reservation utility level. 
Let’s notice that this monetary transfer will not appear in the social welfare function 
because it is a pure transfer from the regulator to the firm i.e. we suppose that there 
is no marginal social cost of public funds.1 In the second stage, firms invest in R&D, 
and in the third one, they produce the contracted quantities. 
The social welfare of a country is equal to the consumer surplus minus damages 
plus the profit of the firm :  
S q q x x CS q D q q x x q x i
a
i j i j i
a
i i i j i j i
a
i i ( , , , , ) ( ) ( , , , , ) ( , ) b b = - + P                   (1)       
or written otherwise :    
S q x x q x x q a q q q kx i
a
i i j i j i j i i i i = - - - - - - + - - -
2 2 1 1 2 a b g b q ( ) ( ) ( )          (2)  
                                                                 
1 The resolution of the autarky and common market cases is possible if we suppose the existence of 
positive marginal social cost of public funds. Unfortunately, the comparison of the equilibrium values in 
the two market regimes becomes very difficult to do.   7
Expression (2) shows that in the third stage when regulator  i  chooses his 
production quantity qi, the pollution coming from country j is not internalized. This 
is general for static models characterized by a linear damage function with respect to 
the total pollution, or a separable one with respect to the pollution remaining at 
home and the one received from the other country.2However, in the second stage 
when regulator i  chooses his level of R&D  xi, transboundary pollution is partially 
internalized if there is R&D spillovers (b„0). The higher the positive externality is, 
the greater proportion of the negative externality is internalized.  








=0                                             (3) 
The resolution of (3) gives : 
[ ] q a x x i
a
i j = - - - -
1
2
1 q a b ( )                                           (4) 




















                                               (5) 
Therefore, the quantity produced by a firm increases with its own R&D level, and 
with the R&D level of the other firm in case of positive spillovers, because they 
reduce its emission/output ratio. 
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                                       (7) 
Expression (7) confirms the fact that without R&D spillovers, transboundary 
pollution is completely non internalized. The higher b is, the greater proportion of 
transboundary pollution is internalized. Part of this negative externality is 
                                                                 
2 If the damages are not linear nor separable, the transboundary pollution is partially non-internalized. 
3 We look for the symmetric equilibrium because, first, the model is symmetric and, second, computations 
are easier.   8
internalized when a country chooses its level of R&D, because such a choice will 
affect the emission ratio of the firm of the other country in case of R&D spillovers, 
which will, in turn, affect the pollution received. 
This strategic interaction with transboundary pollution recalls the analysis of 
Santore et al. (2001), even though their model is drastically different from the one of 
this paper. They examine the strategic behavior of state-level utility regulators when 
pollution spillovers among countries are asymmetric and show that strategic 
behavior is possible because a regulator’s environmental policy indirectly affects the 
price of permits and, therefore, abatement in other states.   








    (C.1)             ,    and   k > + +
1
4
1 2 ( ) ( ) b aa bg                (C.2) 
This last inequality guarantees the second order condition of equation (6). 
We also need that ( ) 1 1 + < b xi
a  ￿ k a > + + -
1
4
1 ( )( )( ) b a bg q                              (C.3) 
The symmetric production quantities are given by (4) :                     
[ ] q x a i
a
i
a = + + - -
1
2
1 ( ) ( ) b a q a                                             (8) 
Condition (C.1) guarantees that the above quantities are positive. 
 
3. Common market 
 
When markets are opened to international trade, the inverse demand function of 
the perfect substitute goods produced by firms becomes :  p a q q i j = - + ( ) . The size 
of the integrated market is a. 
The firms profits are : P i
cm
i j i i i p q q q q kx = - - ( , ) q
2. 






) )( ( ) (
2
1
j i j i j i
j q i q cm
i q q q q q q p dt t p CS + = œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø + + - = ￿
+
. 
The social welfare of country i is :  
S q q x x CS q q D q q x x q q x i
cm
i j i j i
cm
i j i i j i j i
cm
i j i ( , , , , ) ( , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , ) b b = - + P                (9)   9








= 0                                          (10) 
The resolution of (10) is : 
q x x a i
cm
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3 1 ( )                                     (12) 
When a firm increases its level of R&D, this has two opposite effects on its 
production. The first is positive and enables it to produce more because its 
emission/output ratio is lowered. The second is negative, because through R&D 
spillovers the rival firm has a lower emission ratio enabling it to produce more on 
the common market, which forces the initial firm to reduce its production. The 
combination of these two effects always increases production ( ¶ ¶ q x i
cm
i / >0); 
however, such an increase is less important with higher R&D externalities 
(¶ ¶ ¶b
2 0 q x i
cm
i / < ). 
When the rival firm increases its level of innovation, it affects the production of the 
firm both positively and negatively. Indeed, through  b, the firm has a lower 
emission/output ratio which enables it to produce more. But since the rival firm has 
a lower pollution ratio it can produce more, forcing the firm to reduce its 
production. The first positive effect dominates when  b is high enough 
(¶ ¶ b q x i
cm
j / / > ￿ > 0 1 3).   
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2 2 5 1
8 1 2 5 1
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
a bg q a a b g
b a a b g
                                    (14) 
In common market, transboundary pollution is internalized through two channels : 
R&D spillovers and competition of firms on the common market. Indeed, when 
country i chooses its level of innovation this affects the emission ratio of its firm and   10
therefore its production and the production of the competing firm, which in turn 
affects the pollution received by country  i. Therefore, opening the markets to 
international competition helps non-cooperating countries to better internalize 
transboundary pollution, when R&D possibilities are considered. 
The second order condition of the second stage is verified iff : 
2 2 ) 7 6 3 (
16
1
) 1 3 (
4
1
a b b bag b + - + - > k                                            (C.4) 












    (C.5)    ,    and    [ ] k > + + -
1
8
1 2 5 1 ( ) ( ) b a a b g       (C.6) 
We also need that ( ) 1 1 + < b xi
cm  ￿  k a > + + -
1
4
1 ( )( )( ) b a bg q                            (C.7) 
The symmetric production quantities are given by (11) :                     
[ ] q x a i
cm
i
cm = + + - -
1
2
1 ( ) ( ) b a q a                                            (15) 
A sufficient condition for the above production quantities to be positive is : 
(a-q)>a                                                                   (C.8) 
Notice that in both market regimes, countries can implement the non-cooperative 
socially optimal allocations by using two instruments: a subsidy per-unit of R&D to 
induce the desired level of innovation, and a tax per-unit of pollution to induce the 
desired levels of pollution and production.  
In the remaining of the paper, to simplify our computations, we will replace g by 
a. 
In the following propositions, we suppose that conditions (C.1) to (C.3) and (C.4) to 
(C.8) are verified for the autarky and common market regimes, respectively. Notice 
that these conditions, when  g=a, imply that a is sufficiently low and k is sufficiently 
high. Indeed, when the sensitivity of consumers to the environment is high, the 
investment in R&D may be too high when it does not costs much, leading to a 
negative emission ratio which has no economic meaning.   
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4. Common market versus autarky 
 
In the previous sections we have showed that opening markets to international 
trade better internalizes transborder pollution. This suggests that the levels of R&D 
and production are higher in common market. But what about emissions and social 
welfare ? 
 
Proposition 1. The R&D level and production are higher in common market than in autarky, 
whereas the emission/output ratio is lower. 
 
Opening markets to international trade better internalizes transboundary 
pollution, which leads to a higher R&D level than in autarky. Consequently, the 
emission ratio is lower, enabling firms to produce more in common market.4 
It’s interesting to emphasize that these differences are due to the second stage of 
R&D because if the innovation levels were equal in autarky and common market, 
then from (8) and (15), productions, and thus and all the equilibrium values, would 
be equal.  
 
Proposition 2. International trade reduces pollution when a is sufficiently low, and increases 
it when a and k are high enough.  
 
When we increase the R&D level, the emission per-unit of production decreases 
and production increases, which, i n most cases, lowers pollution implying that 
pollution in common market is lower than in autarky. However, when  a is 
sufficiently high, the R&D level provided to internalize pollution is important and 
the emission ratio is low; when markets are opened to i nternational trade, the 
                                                                 
4 Let’s notice that if there was no negative externality between countries, then the equilibrium values in 
autarky and common market would be identical. Indeed, if g=0, expressions (7) and (14) show that the 
R&D levels are equal which implies that all the other equilibrium values are equal in the two market  
regimes. 
   12
emission/output ratio slightly decreases when k is high enough because the 
marginal cost of R&D is increasing, whereas production significantly increases, 
leading to an increase of pollution. Thus, the better internalization of transborder 
pollution engendered by the competition of firms on the common market is 
materialized by an increase in the R&D level which is a choice variable, and does not 
necessarily imply a decrease of pollution. This implies that the non-internalized 
transborder pollution may be greater in common market even if opening markets 
enables to capture a greater proportion of the transfrontier externality. 
 
Proposition 3. International trade increases the social welfare when a is sufficiently low, and 
decreases it when a and k are high enough.  
 
The results of proposition 3 are in concordance with those of propositions 1 and 2. 
Indeed, in most cases, opening markets to international competition increases 
production and innovation and decreases pollution, leading to an increase in social 
welfare. Nevertheless, when  a and k are sufficiently high, pollution in common 
market is higher than in autarky ; moreover, international trade increases production 
and innovation which may reduce the profit of firms; the combination of these effects 
leads to a lower social welfare in common market.  Since this last situation happens 
under very restrictive conditions5, we can say that, in general, opening markets to 
international trade reduces pollution and improves the social welfare. 
 
5. The effect of R&D spillovers  
 
So far, we have shown that a higher  b helps non-cooperating countries to 
internalize a greater proportion of transborder pollution. It is therefore expected that 
when the R&D spillover increases, pollution and the emission/output ratio decrease 
                                                                 
5 We recall that the equilibrium conditions imply that a is sufficiently low. So, when, in addition,  a is 
high enough, the set to which belongs  a is very restricted.   13
whereas the social welfare increases. The following proposition will confirm these 
predictions in almost all the cases, and shows when we have unexpected results. 
 
Proposition 4. i)When  a is sufficiently low, both the equilibrium levels of R&D and 
production increase with b, whereas the emission/output ratio decreases with b. However, 
when a and k are sufficiently high, we have the opposite results.    
ii)In most cases pollution decreases with b, and it increases only when a is neither too high nor 
too low and k is sufficiently high. 
iii)The social welfare increases with the R&D spillover. 
 
We know that when  b increases, a greater proportion of transboundary pollution 
is internalized by non-cooperating regulators, which in most cases leads to a 
diminution of pollution. Such a diminution of pollution can be realized by two 
manners. 
The first happens when a is sufficiently low, and uses the fact that the emission 
ratio decreases with b whereas production increases. The second happens when a 
and k are high enough. Indeed, when a is sufficiently high, the R&D level provided 
is very high, so that to internalize a greater proportion of transboundary pollution 
while reducing pollution, it is preferable to increase the emission ratio (by reducing 
the R&D level) and to reduce production, in the case of a sufficiently high 
investment cost parameter k. 
In some cases, pollution increases with the R&D spillover. Indeed, when a is 
neither too high nor too low and k is sufficiently high, production increases with b  
whereas the emission ratio decreases but not in a sufficiently amount because the 
innovation level and the investment cost parameter are very high, leading to an 
increase of pollution. 
Since the R&D spillover is a free positive externality, the social welfare improves 
when it is increased. In the Appendix, we demonstrate this for almost all the cases 
concerning a and k, and we think there is no reason to get the opposite result for the 
remaining cases not considered.   
   14
6.Conclusion 
 
This model captures the scale and technological effects and tries to answer the 
question of whether opening markets to international trade, in case of transboundary 
pollution, reduces pollution and increases social welfare. It also studies the role of 
the positive R&D spillover and the competition of firms on the common market in 
the internalization of the transfrontier negative externality. 
We consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game played by two 
regulator-firm hierarchies. Each firm produces one good sold on the market and can 
invest in R&D in order to lower its emissions per-unit of production. This research 
activity is characterized by positive R&D spillovers.  
In autarky, we show that without R&D spillovers (b=0), transboundary pollution 
is c ompletely non-internalized. The higher R&D spillover is, the higher the 
proportion of transboundary pollution internalized is. Moreover, opening markets 
to international trade helps competing countries to better internalize transborder 
pollution through the competition of firms on the common market.  
Consequently, when the R&D spillover increases,  pollution decreases in most 
cases whereas the social welfare improves. Therefore, it is recommended for 
countries to voluntarily increase their positive R&D externality through scientific 
communications or exchanges. The issue of cooperation in R&D has not been 
examined in this paper, but we think that it would be beneficial for countries. In 
addition, if countries fully cooperate, then transboundary pollution is completely 
internalized and they reach the first best. 
Opening markets to international trade leads to both more investment in R&D and 
more production. When a is sufficiently low, pollution in common market is lower 
than in autarky implying a greater social welfare. Nevertheless, when a and k are 
high enough, international trade increases pollution and therefore reduces the social 
welfare. Indeed, the non-internalized transborder pollution may be greater, even if 
opening markets enables to better internalize the transfrontier externality; moreover, 
the increase of production and innovation may decrease the profit of firms. Since this 
last situation happens under very restrictive conditions, we can say that, in general,   15
opening markets to international trade reduces pollution and improves the social 
welfare. 
Even if we came to our results by a simple but intuitive model, many of them 
could be generalized to a more complicated context. In this paper, we have assigned 
the same importance to consumer welfare and  profit of the firm. A possible 
extension of this work is to give these latter different weights i.e. to suppose that 
there is positive cost of raising public funds. Another extension is to introduce 
asymmetric information between the regulators and their r espective firms 
concerning their production costs or R&D activity. This may reinforce the potential 
gain to open markets to international trade because the competition on the common 
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A)Proof of Proposition 1 
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From (C.2), (C.3) and (C.6), we get x x i
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i
a - >0, which implies that e e i
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i
a < , and from 
(8) and (15), we also have q q i
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i
a > .    16
B)Proof of Proposition 2 
To compare the emission levels in autarky and common market, we rewrite the 
symmetric equilibrium pollution level of a firm asE x x q x i i i i i ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) = - + 1 1 b ,where 
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C)Proof of Proposition 3 
By using expressions (2) and (9) for the symmetric case, the symmetric equilibrium 
social welfare of a country can be written as :  
( ) S x q x x q x a q x kx i i i i i i i i i i ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = - - - + + - -
2 2 2 1 1 a b q  
where qi and  xi could be the equilibrium values in autarky or common market. By 
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Therefore, if  ( ) a - > q a
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D)Proof of Proposition 4 
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whereas the denominator is positive. Because of condition (C.1), the term between 
the above second square brackets is positive. Thus : 
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Thus, the quantity produced and the emission ratio vary in opposite directions with 
respect to the R&D spillover.             










i ( ) ( )








= +                     














( ) ( )















            (20) 
•If (a-q)>2a, then  dq d i( ) / b b> 0 implying that dE d i( ) / b b<0. 
•Using the expression of  xi
a( ) b ,  f i
a( ) b  has the sign of its numerator 
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iii) Using expressions (2) and (9), the symmetric equilibrium social welfare of a 
country can be written as : 
S q E a q k x i i i i i ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) b b a b q b b =- - + - -
2 2 2  










i ( ) ( )








= - 2                                    (21) 
where g x a i i ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) b b a b q a = + + - - 31 2 3 . 
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